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Abstract: Understanding the freedom in Cavendish’s natural philosophy is 
essential to understanding Cavendish’s work as a whole. In this paper, I will 
examine three different ways in which freedom can be understood and argue that 
Cavendish is best understood as a libertarian. From this conclusion, I will argue 
that consequently, the God in Cavendish’s model must be deistic as opposed to 
providential. Finally, I will summarize and commentate on an article written by 
Karen Detlefsen.  
Introduction 
 A vitalist philosopher in the 17th century, Margaret Cavendish (1623-1673) may have 
faced pressure to include a providential God in her natural philosophy. However, the remarks 
that Cavendish makes about God that might be interpreted as providential, seem to be colloquial 
expressions or afterthoughts rather than representative of her philosophical view. In this paper, I 
will demonstrate that the best way to understand the God presented in Cavendish’s metaphysical 
model is as deistic. To go about this task, first I will establish that Cavendish is a libertarian. 
Next, I will argue that a providential God is incompatible with libertarianism. Finally, I will 
show that both of these factors require that Cavendish’s metaphysics has a deistic God.  
Cavendish is a Libertarian 
 Freedom is an important element for Cavendish’s theory of causation. It may be easier to 
understand Cavendish’s metaphysics by contrasting her view, vitalism, with another dominant 
view at the time, mechanism. Mechanist philosophers that were writing around the same time as 
Cavendish include René Descartes and Thomas Hobbes. Mechanism describes causation through 
force. For example, the mechanist view would argue that the force of a hockey stick hitting a 
puck causes the puck to fly in the opposite direction. However, Cavendish does not think nature 
to be so brutal and forceful. Rather, every animal, vegetable, and mineral is alive and has 
perception, self-knowledge, self-motion, and knowledge of God. Considering the same example, 
the motion of the hockey stick gives the occasion for the puck to move itself rather than the puck 
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being forced to move. In Cavendish’s view, the hockey puck perceives the motion of the hockey 
stick and has the freedom to choose whether or not to move. 
Given this view of causation, it is necessary to understand the kind of freedom in which 
Cavendish has afforded to nature. There are three different ways to understand freedom: 
determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism. Determinism is the view that all actions have 
been pre-determined by an external force; there is no free-will. One who believes in determinism 
might say that though it may seem as though they are making thousands of decisions every day, 
it had already been determined which choice they were going to make; it would have been 
impossible for them to make a different choice.  
Cavendish cannot be a determinist as she states, “Nature hath a natural Free-will and power 
of self-moving, and is not necessitated” (Cavendish, Philosophical Letters, p. 225). If she had 
been a determinist then it would be that the puck was determined to move when struck by the 
hockey stick thereby making it irrelevant if the puck had perception, self-motion, and self-
knowledge. Therefore, determinism is incompatible with Cavendish’s view as free-will is a 
requirement for her model of causation.  
Compatibilism is the view that free-will and determinism are not necessarily opposed and 
can work together. Compatibilism is composed of three parts: determinism, negative liberty, and 
coercive power. Negative liberty says that agents are free when there is nothing preventing them 
from acting on their will. For example, when someone is hungry they will desire food. Negative 
liberty says that so long as you are not prevented from getting food, then you are free. Coercive 
power is “the power to ‘make things happen’, to unilaterally determine that things shall occur in 
a certain way” (Peterson, Hasker, & Reichenbach, Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, 
653) This means that an external force can determine how things will occur and force it’s will 
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upon other beings. For instance, when playing a video game, the player has coercive power. She 
can decide what her character does and when it does it; the character is subject to her will. In 
sum, compatibilism says that though your will has been determined by external forces, so long as 
you are able to comply with that will you are free.  
Some philosophers argue that Cavendish holds a compatibilist view of freedom. There are 
some passages where Cavendish seems to demonstrate determinism. For instance, “…nature the 
servant of God, do order all things and actions of nature, the one by his immutable will, and all 
powerful-command” (Cavendish, Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, 209). As this 
passage states that nature must obey God and that God’s will is immutable, it may be interpreted 
to demonstrate determinism. 
Proponents of this view might cite passages such as, “…the rational are more free and at 
liberty than the sensitive, which are more encumbered with working on, and with the inanimate 
parts of matter;” (Cavendish, Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, 152) to argue that 
she understands freedom in terms of negative liberty. This is because Cavendish seems to be 
measuring freedom in terms of how much a thing is hindered to perform it’s will. Cavendish 
expresses this sentiment several times throughout her text, that the rational part of matter is 
“more free” than the sensitive. However, the best way to understand Cavendish’s view of 
freedom is as a libertarian, not compatibilist.  
Libertarianism argues that free-will is incompatible with determinism. A key element in 
libertarianism is positive liberty. Positive liberty means that one has control over their own 
existence and can act on their own will. For instance, a person may decide whether or not they 
will get out of bed that morning. Their decision comes solely from themselves and they have the 
ability to change their decision at any moment; there is no external force necessitating their 
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decisions and movements. Overall, libertarianism means that agents have free-will; they can 
make their own choices.  
There are several passages throughout Cavendish’s text that support that Cavendish views 
freedom in terms of positive liberty. For example, Cavendish states, “…natural self-motions are 
free and voluntary” and “Nature, which being self-moving, can do no otherwise, but take delight 
in acting, for her Actions are free and easie, and not forced or constrained” (Cavendish, 
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, 127 & Cavendish & Cunning, Margaret 
Cavendish: Essential Writings, 128). Both the former and latter quotes demonstrate that 
Cavendish is describing motion in the positive sense, that matter moves freely. 
Some quotes may be interpreted as showing coercive power such as, “…the actions alter as 
nature pleases, or is decreed by God to work” (Cavendish, Observations Upon Experimental 
Philosophy, 171). One arguing that Cavendish is a compatibilist might interpret this passage to 
mean that Nature must obey God and, therefore, is an indication of determinism. However, when 
looking at Cavendish’s explanation for “disorder” and “irregularities,” it becomes clear this is 
not the case.  
Cavendish states, “Nature hath made every thing Good…yet she hath given her Works power 
of misplacing themselves, which produceth Evil Effects: for, that which corrupts Nature, is the 
disordered mixture” (Cavendish & Cunning, Margaret Cavendish: Essential Writings, 36) This 
passage shows that Nature’s parts have the ability to make their own decisions. Though Nature 
has made “every thing Good”, parts can choose not to obey her, thus creating disorder. 
Therefore, Cavendish’s view of nature is that it has persuasive power. Persuasive power is 
defined as, “power that is exercised by ‘persuading’ other beings to act according to one’s 
desires, but without the ability to compel them to do so” (Peterson, Hasker, & Reichenbach, 
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Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, 656). Persuasive power can be likened to a child-
parent relationship. A parent can instruct their child to pick up his clothes, but it is ultimately up 
to the child whether or not he will perform the task. This is the best way to understand 
Cavendish—Nature, as a mother who is wise and good, and nature’s parts as her children, who 
have the ability to choose whether or not to be obedient.  
Though libertarianism does not necessitate an external power, it is not opposed to persuasive 
power. This is because persuasive power allows for positive liberty as the agent still has ultimate 
control over what decision they make. Therefore, because Cavendish’s view of freedom 
comprises of positive liberty and persuasive power, the best way to understand Cavendish is as a 
libertarian.  
Providentialism says it is possible for God to cause things to happen 
 There are two different ways to understand Cavendish’s view of God: providential and 
deistic. On the one hand, the God that Cavendish describes might be providential. The 
providential God is one that is hands-on. Not only does the providential God create the world, 
but He imposes his will on it. The providential God listens to prayers, performs miracles, and he 
has a plan for every creature on earth. On the other hand, the God Cavendish describes might be 
deistic. This God only created the world. Then, He removed Himself from all human affairs, 
allowing the world to function on its own.  
Providentialism is incompatible with Cavendish’s libertarianism and her view of causation  
 Providentialism is incompatible with libertarianism. If it were the case that God was able 
to interfere with nature and force His will upon creatures, then there would be an absence of 
choice. If there is no choice, then there is no positive liberty. As positive liberty is a key element 
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of libertarianism, it cannot be the case that both libertarianism and a providential God exist in the 
same universe. 
Similarly, Providentialism is incompatible with Cavendish’s view of causation. As discussed 
previously, Cavendish believes that when one object bumps into another, the latter object 
perceives the former and is given the occasion to choose whether or not to move. If it were the 
case that Cavendish’s metaphysics had a providential God, then the object would not be able to 
choose whether or not it moves. This is because the providential God might either have already 
determined the path of every movement or intervene at any moment and make the choice for the 
object. Therefore, a providential God does not fit in with Cavendish’s view of causation. 
Further, if it were the case that the God in Cavendish’s metaphysics was providential, then it 
would pose another problem for Cavendish’s work—force. Cavendish’s metaphysics focuses on 
the idea that there is a minimal amount of force in nature. Even in cases where there seems to be 
a clear display of force, Cavendish insists that this isn’t the case. For instance, when describing 
the difficulty of starting a fire in the cold, Cavendish argues:  
“Not that the cold corporeal motions do destroy fire by their actual power over it; 
but, that fire destroys itself by an imitation of the motions of cold: So that cold is only 
an occasional cause of the fire’s destruction, or at least, of the alteration of its 
motions, and the diminution of its strength” (Cavendish, Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy, 121).  
This passage describes that the fire destroys itself rather than the cold forcing the fire to perish. If 
it were the case that the God in Cavendish’s natural philosophy was providential and used 
coercive power, then parts of nature would be forced to perform actions. This would go against 
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Cavendish’s arguments that there is no force. Therefore, there cannot be a providential God that 
forces change in Nature in Cavendish’s metaphysics.  
 Lastly, if it were the case that the God in Cavendish’s natural philosophy was 
providential, then it would pose the question of how an immaterial body can create effects in the 
material world. This is called the mind-body problem. Cavendish describes God as an 
“…infinite, incomprehensible, supernatural, and immaterial essence, void of all parts” as 
opposed to nature which Cavendish states is material (Cavendish, Observations Upon 
Experimental Philosophy, 38). If it is the case that God is providential and immaterial, then 
Cavendish must offer an explanation as to how this immaterial being can create effects in the 
material world.  
Therefore, Cavendish can’t believe in a Providential God and remain consistent 
 If God is Providential, then He can interfere with the material world and make changes at 
his will. However, as I argued earlier, Cavendish is a libertarian and the God in her metaphysics 
uses persuasive power. This means that all creatures have positive freedom; they can make their 
own choices. Therefore, the God in Cavendish’s metaphysics cannot be providential and remain 
consistent. Consequently, the best way to understand Cavendish’s model of natural philosophy is 
to understand her God as deistic.  
 One passage that supports the view that the God in Cavendish’s metaphysics is deistic is 
the following: 
“God is the first author of motion…but I cannot believe that God should be the 
prime actual movement of all natural creatures, and put all things into local 
motion, like as one wheel in a clock turns all the rest (Cavendish, Observations 
Upon Experimental Philosophy, 212). 
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This passage makes an important assertion. First, that God created motion. There is an important 
distinction to be made between God being the first mover and God creating motion. The key 
difference is that if God is the first mover, it would follow that all motions that have occurred 
after God’s first movement have happened because of Him. If this were the case, then it would 
suggest determinism. However, understanding God as the creator of motion takes on an entirely 
different meaning; God has created the phenomena of “motion” and put it in nature. This 
understanding does not suggest determinism and in line with Cavendish’s libertarianism. 
 Another important passage states, “…yet [Nature] hath so much liberty, that in her 
particulars she works as she pleaseth, and as God has given her power; but she being wise, acts 
according to her infinite natural wisdom, which is the cause of her orderly government” 
(Cavendish, Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, 109). This reading demonstrates 
Cavendish’s view that God has created Nature to have self-government. This means that Nature 
is not required to obey God’s commands, but rather is wise enough to create the order and 
harmony of nature in which we see around us. Some examples of the order in nature are 
phenomena such as rain coming down from the sky allowing for grass to grow, food coming 
from seeds to satisfy hunger, the circle of life, etc.  
On the other hand, there are some passages that may be interpreted as the God in 
Cavendish’s metaphysics being providential which would pose a problem for my view. 
Cavendish sometimes speaks in a way that suggests a providential God. For instance, “I hope 
God of his mercy will preserve state, church, and schools, from ruin and destruction” and “…but 
if God favour her” (Cavendish, Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy, 8 & 12). Some 
might argue that this shows Cavendish really believes in a Providential God, and, therefore, the 
God in her metaphysics must be providential. However, I would argue that in these quotes 
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Cavendish is merely speaking colloquially and that they do not truly represent her metaphysical 
views. 
Detlefsen’s View on Cavendish and God 
 Karen Detlefsen wrote an article entitled, “Margaret Cavendish on the Relation Between 
God and World” in 2009. In this article, Detlefsen explores the role of teleology in Cavendish’s 
work, and, along the way, draws conclusions about the role God plays in Cavendish’s writings. 
Teleology is defined as, “a doctrine explaining phenomena by final causes” meaning that one 
can discover the purpose of a thing based on its outcome (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). 
Ultimately, Detlefsen looks at both natural, Aristotelian teleology and unnatural, Platonic 
teleology. Natural teleology argues that one’s purpose is intrinsic and is followed unconsciously. 
On the other hand, unnatural teleology argues that purpose is external; one’s purpose is to 
achieve a goal made by an external agent (i.e. God).  
 Through proving her conclusion, Detlefsen’s conversation turns to God’s role in 
Cavendish’s work. As Cavendish describes that there can be disorder, Detlefsen is tasked with 
finding how it is that Cavendish distinguishes between those behaviors that are “normal” and 
those that are “perverted” meaning distorted or corrupted.  As Detlefsen concludes that “God is 
the ultimate source of nature’s norms”, Detlefsen must then explain how it is that God 
communicates these norms to His creation (Detlefsen, 14). Much like my own assertion, 
Detlefsen argues that God might communicate these norms by way of “rationally suggesting this 
order to material nature” and hence all “interaction is through rational suggestion” (Detlefsen, 
14). Though she does not use the same term, this is another way of describing persuasive power. 
From this assertion, Detlefsen draws her ultimate conclusion that Cavendish “has a blended form 
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of teleology” as Cavendish describes parts of nature as having “natures proper to them” as well 
as a reliance on God to create order in the world through rational suggestion (Detlefsen, 15 & 9).  
Conclusion 
 As Cavendish describes parts of nature as having positive liberty, it is fair to conclude 
that she is a libertarian. Further, throughout Cavendish’s work, there is evidence that the God she 
describes uses persuasive power to suggest that parts of nature ought to act in an orderly manner. 
If it were the case that the God in Cavendish’s model was providential, this would pose problems 
for her work. For instance, it would force Cavendish to answer to the mind-body problem as well 
as create an inconsistency with her view on force. From these conclusions, I have argued that the 
best way to understand the God represented in Cavendish’s metaphysical model is as deistic.  
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